Colombia's Enduring Rebellion: The History of the FARC's Rise to Power and the Future of its Collapse

I. Out of the Jungle

On July 2^nd, 2008, members of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC), a leftist-guerrilla movement over four decades old, accidentally released their most prized hostage: Ingrid Betancourt. The FARC had kept her hidden in the jungles of Colombia (in the company of around 750 other hostages)[1] for more than six years, demanding a prisoner exchange with the government of Colombia. Her kidnapping in early 2002, while she was running for President, brought international attention to the conflict described by the UN as “one of the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.”[2]

Now freed, Betancourt immediately became an international celebrity with videos of her rescue and reunion with her family broadcast around the world. She spent much of her first weeks of freedom providing interviews to the likes of Larry King and Ann Curry of CNN and MSNBC, respectively, describing the horrors of captivity that aged her decades. The world listened as she addressed the French Parliament, the people of Colombia, and the hostages that remain in the Colombian jungles with speeches of gratitude and advice. Leaders from around the world including US President, George Bush, Colombian President, Alvaro Uribe, and French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, praised the rescue effort as a monumental success while cameras followed Betancourt from Bogotá to Paris as journalists asked her question after question. She seemed exhausted and fragile, but willing to be the face for a cause to end the Colombian crisis that has haunted its citizens for decades.

Betancourt’s rescue captures the contrast from the strong position the FARC attained less than a decade ago to their current status of a severely weakened movement. 2008 has seen several things go wrong for the FARC: hostages have been freed, high-ranking officials have died, and the international backlash towards the group seems stronger than ever. Their forty-year campaign to take over power in Colombia appears to be weakening. Their ascension from a small group from the jungle fighting for social justice to the largest insurgency in the Americas has taken its toll. The FARC have had to change their identity in a world where a Marxist revolution no longer applies. The administration of the current Colombian President has targeted them, and with help from the United States the FARC’s days are numbered. Colombians are crying “No Más,” or no more, to the violence that has had its roots in an old political conflict.

II. The Origins of a Terrorist Organization

The sad truth of Colombia’s history resides in the fact that its people know little—if anything—of peace and stability. Colombia’s modern political struggles can be traced down to a long history of conflict between conservatives and liberals: the two competing parties have grappled for power since the country’s independence from Spain in 1810. The battles in the early days of the country centered around the role of the Catholic Church in Colombia’s government as well as the relationship between the wealthy elite and the lower-class peasants, and these arguments tended to be enforced with violence.[3] The Epoch of Civil Wars and the War of a Thousand Days (1899-1903) proved that neither side was willing to allow opposing opinions to garner military support while they acquired the presidency.

The conservatives lost the presidency that they held for most of the first three decades of the 20^th century when voters turned them down in 1930 during the Great Depression that severely devalued Colombia’s prime exports, notably coffee. The liberals took control for the following sixteen years with reforms that included more land rights for the poor, a freedom welcomed and quickly taken advantage of; however, two liberal candidates in the 1946 elections split the liberal vote and conservative Mariano Pérez took office. Pérez’s party, bitter at the persecution they faced from the liberals during their sixteen year reign, gained power with a sense of vengeance. La Violencia, a grueling political battle that would claim the lives of over 200,000 Colombians—often in the cruelest of ways—had commenced.[4]

Violence sparked in 1948 when Jorge Gaitán, leader of the left-wing of the liberal party and one of the presidential candidates that lost in the 1946 election, was assassinated in the capital, Bogotá. The conflict continued in the following decades that brought a fascist dictator, a military coup, and rule by a military junta. Some party leaders in 1957, in an effort to quell the violence and political unrest, started the National Front, a bipartisan coalition designed to share power equally among conservatives and liberals in virtually every office of Colombia’s government (with the presidency changing hands every four years). Unfortunately, violence and animosity did not cease, as opposition to the National Front arrived from their partnership with the United States and an economic recession.[5]

The political scene in Colombia was thus ideal for a rebel organization to surface: political strife, low-voter turnout, and a lack of nationalistic sentiment justified the use of force to overthrow the government. Several leftist guerilla groups erupted during this time period, but lacked organization. The man that provided some structure, Manuel “Tirofijo” (Sure-shot) Marulanda, took the opportunity to mobilize disillusionment with the Liberal Party when he created the FARC in 1966. The FARC adopted a Marxist ideology that necessitated the end of democracy and thus the current government system of Colombia, leading to the kidnapping and war-torn culture that has plagued Colombia for decades.[6]

A simple glance at the Colombian conflict may bring comparisons to other rebellions in the Americas; however, a deeper understanding of Colombia’s troubles differentiates their condition from the situations that produced the “Guevara” rebellions of a decade before. Colombia’s conflict—destructive, dividing, dominant—is not an inter-class struggle. The battles fought have almost solely been political, as the governing system of the country has not been able to keep the peace between two competing ideologies that have been at odds for over a century. While the FARC may argue that they take arms in hopes of providing social justice through communist rule, their targets are intentionally ambiguous. The safety of a rural village under the scope of a FARC militia group resides on their willingness and capability to cooperate with the rebels; they may kidnap anyone who comes across their territory if they think that person has value to their name. The unique structure of the struggle produces two major consequences that hinder and benefit the rebels: the FARC remains an isolated group that has no limits to how they conduct their war and the unstable national government has refused to delineate a long-term policy regarding the FARC.

As the FARC have no inherent unified base—as opposed to the French and American revolutions as well as several others—their rebellion must gather support and victories with tactics frowned upon by the international community. Rather than welcoming flocks of people that leave home to join the FARC, the rebels must go into communities to recruit new guerillas. Among the recruits are children under eighteen years of age (who make up around 20-30% of all FARC combatants) who join out of fear, promises of money, food, and protection. The Human Rights Watch documents that the FARC train children as young as thirteen to fight and they “are often ordered to participate in summary executions, torture, murder, kidnapping and attacks on civilians,” while the lingering threat of harming the children’s family always keeps them in check.[7] The FARC also use savage fighting techniques that often leave neutral and innocent civilians dead or displaced. Though the FARC repeatedly claim that they don’t target civilians, land mines used to repel both Colombian national forces and other paramilitary groups often kill innocents. In 2006 alone, mines affected 320 Colombians, including 66 children, and killed 57 of them. Fear of encountering mine fields leads farmers and entire villages to relocate away from their homes. Defying international humanitarian law, the FARC shrugs off their critics while justifying the casualties as “the norm” in any military conflict.[8] The use of gas cylinder bombs, highly destructive devices with imprecise aim, is another FARC necessity in battle that provides more international contempt toward the rebels as the bombs destroy innocent lives and villages.[9] The mere application of these techniques—most of which are now abandoned by rebel groups around the world—prove both the determination of the FARC and their lack of a proper support base that would eliminate the requirement to use tactics that harm civilians.

The status of the Colombian conflict—political with no bearing on class—also supplies advantages to the rebels. The conservative-liberal disagreement—the very same that harbored the FARC’s creation—carries on when discussing how to react to the FARC. Politicians are at odds discussing the FARC problem: one side promotes peace negotiations and cease-fires, while others, such as the current Colombian president Alvaro Uribe, support a tough, hard-line, military policy against the FARC. Because the presidency shifts between the two ideas on a regular basis, Colombia has lacked a well-defined policy regarding the FARC. Both parties absorb criticism that they are either working with the rebels or working against a lasting peace between the two organizations while escalating violence. The national government’s confusion, inconsistency, and weakness provide stability to the guerrillas. While the politicians have debated and applied conflicting policies, the FARC have continued their ruthless campaign for forty years with stability that has only seemed to decrease with recent accomplishments.

III. The Story of Ingrid Betancourt

By the time Ingrid Betancourt ran for President of Colombia in 2002, history’s course had changed the way the FARC looked. With the Soviet Union’s collapse in the early 1990s, the FARC “survived the end of the cold war, but at the cost of its ideological purity.”[10] While they suffered in this moralistic fashion, the FARC grew financially at an exponential rate by turning toward the drug trade in Colombia. By controlling the lands in the Colombian jungles where the coca plant and other varieties thrive, they have established a taxing system that brings in around $300 million a year.[11] With that income added on to finances from kidnapping and extortion, the FARC has more than enough funds to purchase the necessary weapons needed to continue their war. The Presidency of Andrés Pastrana, a conservative, brought about attempted peace negotiations with the FARC that even granted them a safe-haven in the country. Unfortunately, they continued attacking the state and kidnapping high-ranking officials, which required Pastrana to back out of his talks of peace. Thus the 2002 elections became one primarily on what to do with the rebels. For Betancourt, the answer was a Nueva, or new, Colombia.

Betancourt was not new to politics. Her mother, a former Miss Colombia, and her father were both involved in the Colombian political system. She describes her rise to politics in 1989 as an “awakening,” where she “discovered that [conservatives and liberals] are the same,” and that “there was a secret alliance between politicians and drug traffickers.”[12] She would be elected to the Colombian House in 1994 and the Senate in 1998 (the latter with her creation, the Oxygen Green Party). During those years she was known to rile up the two main political parties by continuously accusing them of corruption, especially President Ernesto Samper.[13]

In January 2002 she took to the streets of Bogotá to acquire support for her Presidential campaign. With all the beauty that her mother had, Betancourt ran her Colombia Nueva campaign by passing out Viagra to commuters, asking them to “let their vote be like Viagra for Colombia,” implying, quite correctly, that the country was dissatisfied with their government.[14] The ironic part of Betancourt’s tale occurred on February 14, 2002, where Betancourt and the other presidential candidates, including Horatio Serpa and Alvaro Uribe, met with the FARC in a demilitarized zone for a public conference. During her allotted time to speak, Betancourt urged the FARC to work with the national government for peaceful negotiations. She would also utter a line that would be repeated by millions of people around the world in the following decade: “No más secuestros.” No more kidnapping.

Nine days later, on route to a campaign stop into a former demilitarized zone, Ingrid Betancourt and her campaign manager, Clara Rojas, were taken by guerrilla forces into FARC custody. One of her kidnappers, Nolberto Uni, would later report in prison that the kidnapping was “never planned,” and that “the order was to detain all politicians of national stature.”[15] While the event entered the headlines of international news stations, Colombian’s could only keep living life and go on with the elections: the kidnapping of politicians was not at all unusual, and many felt she paid for her risk-taking as she was warned of the dangers of traveling by ground. The soon to be lame duck president was powerless to do anything even if he wished it. Betancourt’s family even discouraged any rescue attempts as they feared for her life if a confrontation occurred.

The result of the Presidential Election on May 26^th, 2002 proved Betancourt’s claim of dissatisfaction with the government. The majority of the voters chose Independent candidate Alvaro Uribe, whose campaign was centered on a tough policy against the FARC that included military build up and foreign aid. Uribe’s election predicted that Betancourt’s residence with the FARC would last as long as he held power. While some of the FARC’s kidnappings are aimed at gaining ransom money, others attempt to pressure the government to engage in prisoner-exchange deals with them. Because of Uribe’s firm stance of not negotiating with the terrorist organization, a deal between his administration and the rebels proved unlikely. On the other side, since Uribe’s administration crippled the FARC’s military power, prisoner exchanges became all too important for the rebels. Eventually Betancourt’s family, including her first husband and two children in France, urged the United States government and France to work with Uribe in pressuring the FARC to release her.[16]

After over six years of silence, a few times interrupted by photos, videos, and letters that proved that Betancourt was alive, the liberation that caught the world by storm occurred on July 2^nd, 2008. In a rescue mission dubbed Operation Check that Colombian authorities called “an unprecedented operation that will go down in history for its audacity and effectiveness,” Colombian militiamen, adorned with t-shirts containing the image of Che Guevara, pretended to be a non-governmental humanitarian group that offered the FARC a helicopter to transfer fifteen hostages (including Betancourt) to another FARC hideout.[17] The mission would not be possible without the help of one particular guerrilla who became disillusioned with the FARC and helped the Colombian government fool one of the top-ranked officials of the FARC, a man called Cesar. The FARC had lost their most valuable bargaining chip in a year that will prove to be very costly to them.

The story of Ingrid Betancourt provides clear insight into the current situation of the FARC. When she was captured in 2002, a nation was desperate for action, the FARC was affecting the governments’ every move with strong military pressure, and the national government had seemingly too many problems on their hands with every cartel and guerrilla group threatening stability. Six years and four months later, the country is strongly behind its leader, as are big international names, and the desperation that used to belong to Colombians now belongs to the guerrillas. Peace and stability now seems more attainable then ever, as Colombian dissatisfaction finally united to turn against the plagues that harmed the country for decades. Betancourt, who ran her campaign against the theory of strong military force against the FARC, thanked Uribe after the rescue and commented that he “has been a very good president.”[18] But to accomplish such a drastic and positive change in the Colombian conflict, Mr. Uribe needed and was granted help from a particular ally.

IV. The United States Factor

The US-Colombia relationship got off to a terrible start when Teddy Roosevelt helped neighboring Panama gain independence from Colombia then proceeded to build his canal in 1903. The next Roosevelt provided a warmer relationship with his Good Neighbor policy that focused more on helping the Latin-American governments already in place rather than directly intervening in their domestic affairs. But the United States abandoned their non-interventionist policy with Colombia in the late 1990s when Americans grew tired of illegal narcotic consumption and Colombians were on the brink of collapse from a muscular FARC, numerous cartels, insurgencies, and paramilitary groups all discrediting the national government.

In 1999, President Bill Clinton and Colombian President Andrés Pastrana created Plan Colombia, which called for “social welfare, reforms in the justice system, jobs, foreign investment, negotiations with Marxist guerrillas who have been fighting the government for nearly 40 years, and, above all, more muscle to fight the drug trade.”[19] The deal made Colombia the third highest beneficiary of US aid in 2000, only trailing Egypt and Israel. The plan ultimately failed on several levels: the aid did not target rebel groups while treating “narcotraffickers and rebels as separate problems when in fact their activities are deeply intertwined,” and it encouraged corruption by providing “little to strengthen crucial layers of government.”[20] Drugs continued to flow in to the United States from Colombia at an increasing rate while violence in Colombia refused to subside. In reaction to these failures the Bush administration intended to pump more money into Plan Colombia; however—like countless other foreign policy decisions—plans shifted after September 11, 2001. Bush’s neoconservative foreign policy initiative quickly transitioned the War on Drugs into the War on Terror. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia became just one of the dozens of groups labeled as a terrorist organization by the President in an executive order signed September 23, 2001.[21] Colombia’s election of the tough right-wing President, Alvaro Uribe, in May 2002 provided the United States with a close ally as Uribe campaigned on a platform of a strong military presence against the FARC. Plan Colombia then gained a necessary focus by shifting attention away from drug traffickers and towards rebel insurgencies like the FARC.

The consequences from an influx of United States financial support have been staggering and leave the FARC crippled. The rebels must resort to medieval communication techniques as the modern uses of radios and satellites were easily infiltrated by United States technology. As a result, the FARC must focus as smaller units, “weakening the grip of the leaders on the more remote fronts, and making large-scale co-ordinated attacks very difficult.”[22] While Colombian security forces have increased to 270,000 men, the number of FARC combatants has decreased enormously, from 16,000 fighters in 2001 to around 6,000-8,000 today.[23] Uribe’s government encourages desertion by weakening punishment in exchange for information—a move that directly lead to Betancourt’s rescue. 2008 has seen the killing of high ranking FARC officials like Raul Reyes in a military effort, Ivan Rios in an assassination committed by his body guard, and most importantly, Manuel Marulanda, the man who created the FARC in the mid 1960s, who died of a heart attack.[24] The United States offers large amounts of credit to these successes towards Uribe—President Bush consistently states that “Uribe has taken bold stands to defend our shared democratic values. He has been a strong and capable partner in fighting drugs and crime and terror. He's demonstrated that he is deeply committed to providing a better future for the people of his country.”[25]

The liberation of Betancourt secured another large success for both the US and Colombia as three of Betancourt’s companions were American citizens taken hostage when their military spy plane crashed in FARC territory in 2003. According to the White House, “the United States had been working with the government of Colombia for the last several years, ever since the American hostages had been taken, in order to try to free them safely and successfully in a way that would not cause any harm to the individuals.” In the rescue mission itself, the Bush administration provided support and planning advice, but labeled the operation as “largely a Colombian exercise.”[26] This rhetoric gains both international support for the United States and Colombia’s efforts in the jungles and domestic support in the United States to continue and enhance a US-Colombian partnership.

President Bush has already commenced advertising for a stronger relationship. On July 22^nd, he celebrated Colombian Independence Day at the White House with a speech on Colombia—outlining the history of the relationship, the successes of Plan Colombia, and urging Congress to pass a free-trade agreement with Colombia that was signed over a year and a half ago. Congress, especially the Democrats, is reluctant to pass the deal due to lack of trust in Colombian stability. Republican Presidential candidate John McCain made the trade agreement an election issue with his visit to Colombia in early July (suspiciously at the same time Operation Check occurred); the Democratic National Committee attacked McCain and the proposed deal, believing “that McCain’s support of the Colombia Free Trade Agreement would further U.S. job losses.”[27] But even if McCain manages to scrape a victory in the November elections, it is unlikely that what will probably be a Democratic majority in Congress would approve the deal.

With or without free trade between the two nations, the United States must keep Colombia as a close ally for its own self-interest. The region around Colombia is filled with leftist and anti-American FARC sympathizers: Bolivia’s Evo Morales, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa, Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega, and most familiar Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez. Chávez, though he has warmed relations with neighbor Colombia, continues to be hostile toward the US—all while gaining international friends such as France and Russia. Before Operation Check, French President Nicolas Sarkozy “had put much faith in the Venezuelan president as a negotiator with the FARC,” and had even succeeded in obtaining the release of Betancourt’s campaign manager, Clara Rojas, in January 2008.[28] In late July 2008, while Chávez was visiting Moscow, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev commented that “Venezuela is now the most important partner of the Russian Federation” while Chávez noted that “if Russia's armed forces want to be present in Venezuela, they will be given a warm welcome.”[29] While these seemingly alarming gestures contain no immediate threat, the US must continue to keep a close eye on Venezuela’s actions. Partnered with a close ally in Colombia, the US can maintain their presence and influence in the region to prevent a potential conflict and pressure aggressive countries to warm relations with the world’s sole superpower.

Whatever the arguments on whether American dollars need to be in Colombia or not, US intervention has played a prominent role in positively changing the Colombian conflict. The rejuvenation of Plan Colombia brought the conflict to a new stage—one that requires diligence and caution from both parties when crafting future policies. The future of Colombia seems clearer now, with political stability and peace in sight. Colombia’s problems are by no means over, but officials can manipulate the current situation to their advantage.

V. The Future FARC Policy

On July 20, 2008, Colombian Independence Day, hundreds of thousands of Colombians took to the streets clad in symbolic white while crying for peace and the release of remaining hostages. Ingrid Betancourt’s speech at a rally in France was broadcast in her home country while celebrations were held around the country in a day filled with national pride and emotion. Colombia now stands in a situation never experienced before: the President has overwhelming popularity (over 80%), the economy is growing rapidly, and the government has a firm advantage over the FARC. President Alvaro Uribe—who plans to change the Colombian Constitution for a second time to allow him a third term until 2014—must handle this stage of history with care, as hostile neighbors will pounce on any weakness they find to stop the progress of the national government. Meanwhile, the FARC remain dangerous—the Colombian police recently prevented a potential FARC attack on the capital during a national holiday on August 7^th when they discovered two vehicles stuffed with explosives; but the fact that the attack was prevented, and that six guerrillas in charge of executing the attack were captured, demonstrate the government’s control over the FARC.

The goal of peace is near, but the government must change some aspects of policy while continuing others to achieve a peace with a minimal amount of blood spilt. Peace negotiations have failed in the past, but previous attempts were not backed up by the strong position that the government now attains. Alfonso Cano, identified as the leader of the FARC after Manuel Marulanda’s death, stated in a 2001 interview with The Economist that “our struggle is to do away with the state as now it exists in Colombia,” and fighting would not stop for offers of minor political power or other incentives.[30] However, now that the tables are turned, perhaps the majority of the rebels would be more lenient to comply with peaceful negotiations with the government as their “struggle” is struggling indeed. The successful Colombian military policy of attacking FARC leaders while encouraging dissenters to change sides should continue, but as the successes carry on, larger peace settlements should eventually come to the table. Before that happens, Colombia needs to alter their viewpoint of the FARC: in the words of Ingrid Betancourt, “[Colombia] must change this radical, extremist vocabulary of hate of very strong words that intimately wound the human being.”[31] Anti-terrorist rhetoric, a hand-me down tactic from the United States, is no longer necessary as the Colombian government has major international support in their fight with the rebels. Even Hugo Chávez, potentially to save his name after he was accused of financing the FARC, surprisingly noted that “at this moment in Latin America, an armed guerrilla movement is out of place” (though he maintained anti-American rhetoric in his speech).[32] The New York Times calls for Uribe to “capitalize on that disarray and offer the rebels…a political settlement.”[33] While this option might not offer realistic progress at the current time, the idea should be a national priority once the FARC admits its seemingly irreversible downward spiral.

The greatest mistake the Colombian government can make is one of arrogance: the fact that the FARC can be militarily defeated may tempt officials to sponsor a full-on attack on the FARC. Such a rash action would precipitate mass casualties from both sides and potentially harm the several hundred hostages still awaiting freedom in the jungles. Afterwards, even with the probable outcome of a victory, international support for Colombia’s motives would dwindle from scenes of the violence. Afterwards, surviving rebels would use their arms to create more problems in Colombia, potentially in the drug industry. Comprehensive peace and stability requires two things: the complete disarmament of rebels and the release of all prisoners. A deal for these things in return for minor political power and amnesty for the lower-ranked guerrillas is well worth the long-sought for result of peace.

For the first time in modern history, Colombia has an optimistic attitude toward its future. Its history of government instability has met its match with Alvaro Uribe, who has managed to unite Colombians towards a unified goal of dismantling their fellows who went astray during a time of political uncertainty. The United States’ effort to solve the Colombian crisis has seen positive results and both countries now have a strong, friendly relationship with each other. Ingrid Betancourt’s image as a free woman brings hope that others will soon return as well, while her words command respect from leaders of foreign powers. Analysts around the globe are no longer solely reporting on the amount of trouble Colombian’s face. Instead, they are contemplating the inevitable downfall of problems. The Economist is asking whether there is “Peace for Colombia?”. The BBC wonders if FARC is “a fading force?”. Meanwhile, Reason magazine cheers “Hooray for Uribe.” The tide is turning in Colombia, and the process of establishing a peaceful nation has begun.

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[1] “Betancourt, US contractors rescued from FARC.” CNN News, www.cnn.com, 3 July, 2008.

[2] “Quick Guide: Colombian Conflict.” BBC News, www.bbc.co.uk, 3 November 2006.

[3] The modern Colombian government describes the 1860s and 1870s as the “Epoch of Civil Wars.” 51 out of the 240 months contained “some form of civil conflict.” “Colombia." Encyclopædia Britannica. 2008. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 04 Aug. 2008 <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/126016/Colombia>.

[4] “La Violencia, dictatorship, and democratic restoration." Encyclopædia Britannica. 2008. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 04 Aug. 2008 <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/126016/Colombia>.

[5] Ibid

[6] “Peace for Colombia?” The Economist. www.economist.com . May 29^th, 2008.

[7] Women make up around 30% of all FARC combatants. “Colombia: Armed Groups Send Children to War.” Human Rights Watch. www.hrw.org. February 22, 2005. “In the Jungle with FARC” Time Magazine. www.time.com. August 4, 2008.

[8] “Report Cites Rebel’s Wide Use of Mines in Colombia” Washington Post. www.washingtonpost.com. July 26, 2007.

[9] “Colombia: More FARC Killings with Gas Cylinder Bombs.” Human Rights Watch. www.hrw.org. April 15, 2005.

[10] “Peace for Colombia?” The Economist. www.economist.com. May 29^th, 2008.

[11] “Colombia’s most powerful rebels.” BBC News. www.bbc.co.uk. September 19, 2003.

[12] The Kidnapping of Ingrid Betancourt. Women Make Movies. Prod. Victoria Bruce and Karen Hayes. 2003.

[13] Betancourt claims that while Congress was investigating links between Samper and a Colombian cartel, she was ambushed by a group in her vehicle and barely managed to escape thanks to her skillful driver. Ibid. Samper was President between 1994-1998, and the investigation proved inconclusive.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Uni sent a letter of apology to French President Nicolas Sarkozy (Betancourt, via her first marriage, has French citizenship) while serving a 34 year long imprisonment for abduction. See “Betancourt’s kidnapper says he’s sorry.” Colombia Reports. www.colombiareports.com. April 15^th, 2008.

[16] “Fresh Plea for Colombian Hostage.” BBC News. www.bbc.co.uk. August 17^th, 2008.

[17] “How Colombia freed the hostages.” BBC News. www.bbc.co.uk. July 4^th, 2008.

[18] “‘Miracle’ rescue frees Betancourt, three Americans.” Bajak, Frank. Denver Post. www.denverpost.com. July 3^rd, 2008.

[19] “The Drug War’s Southern Front: Colombia, cocaine, and US Foreign Policy.” Pratt, Timothy. Reason Magazine. www.reason.com. April, 2000.

[20] “Helping Colombia Fix Its Plan to Curb Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Insurgency.” Johnson, Stephen. The Heritage Foundation. www.heritage.org. April 26, 2001.

[21] The FARC was officially annexed on November 2, 2001. See “Comprehensive List of Terrorists and Groups Identified Under Executive Order 13224.” US Department of State. www.state.gov.

[22] “Colombia’s rebels: A fading force?” McDermott, Jeremy. BBC News. www.bbc.co.uk. February 1, 2008.

[23] “Peace for Colombia?” The Economist. www.economist.com. May 29^th, 2008.

[24] The killing of Raul Reyes in Ecuador caused a diplomatic crisis that involved Ecuador and Venezuela harshly criticizing Colombia for invading Ecuador. After insults were thrown from both sides, relations have somewhat cooled, especially the Colombian-Venezuelan partnership, after evidence linked the FARC to Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa and Venezuelan President and anti-American Hugo Chávez. See “The war behind the insults.” The Economist. www.economist.com. March 6^th, 2008. The bodyguard who killed Rios cut off his hand and claimed a $1 million reward from the government. See “Leader’s death harsh blow to Farc.” McDermott, Jeremy. BBC News. www.bbc.co.uk. May 25, 2008.

[25] “President Bush Honors Colombian Independence Day.” President Bush. The White House. www.whitehouse.gov. July 22, 2008.

[26] “Press Briefing by Dana Perino.” The White House. www.whitehouse.gov. July 3^rd, 2008. In a suspicious coincidence, Republican Presidential candidate John McCain was visiting Colombia when the rescue mission occurred and was briefed on the particulars by Uribe. The White House claims that no information was passed on to McCain.

[27] “DNC blasts McCain on Trade, Colombia.” Montanaro, Domenico. MSNBC.

[28] “How dare the Colombians rescue Ingrid Betancourt?” The Economist. www.economist.com. July 3^rd, 2008.

[29] “Chavez calls for Russian alliance.” BBC News. www.bbc.co.uk. July 22, 2008.

[30] “Peace for Colombia?” The Economist. www.economist.com. May 29^th, 2008.

[31] “End Farc ‘hate’, Betancourt urges.” BBC News. www.bbc.co.uk. July 8^th, 2008.

[32] “Chavez urges FARC to end struggle.” CNN News. www.cnn.com. June 8^th, 2008.

[33] “Freeing Ingrid Betancourt.” New York Times. www.nytimes.com. July 4^th, 2008.